AN ASSESSMENT OF THE YUGOSLAVIA WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL
Michael P. Scharf*
I.
INTRODUCTION
In May 1993, in response to the "ethnic cleansing" of some 250,000
Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council adopted a resolution
establishing the Yugoslavia Tribunal; in September 1993, the General
Assembly elected the Tribunal's judges; and in July 1994, the Security
Council appointed its Prosecutor. As of the time of this writing, the
Yugoslavia Tribunal has indicted over fifty suspects, including Bosnian Serb
leader Radovan Karadzic and his military chief, General Ratko Mladic, yet
only a few trials have commenced.
The establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal marked the first time
since the Allies created the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military tribunals
following World War II that an international court was set up to prosecute
persons responsible for such international crimes. Justice Robert Jackson,
the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, concluded his report to the President on
the Nuremberg Trials by acknowledging that "many mistakes have been
made and many inadequacies must be confessed." But he went on to say
that he was "consoled by the fact that in proceedings of this novelty, errors
and missteps may also be instructive to the future." As the first international
criminal court, the Nuremberg Tribunal provides a benchmark for assessing
the Yugoslavia Tribunal. The question, then, is have we learned from the
mistakes of Nuremberg?

II.

A COMPARISON

WITH NUREMBERG

There were four main criticisms levied on Nuremberg. First, that it
was a victor's tribunal before which only the vanquished were called to
account for violations of international humanitarian law. Second, that the
defendants were prosecuted and punished for crimes expressly defined for
the first time in an instrument adopted by the victors at the conclusion of the
war. Third, that the Nuremberg Tribunal functioned on the basis of limited
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procedural rules that inadequately protected the rights of the accused. And
finally, that it was a tribunal of first and last resort, since it had no appellate
chamber.
A. Victor's Justice
Elsewhere, I have written that in contrast to Nuremberg, the
Yugoslavia Tribunal was created neither by the victors nor by the parties
involved in the conflict, but rather by the United Nations, representing the
international community of States. Yet, this is perhaps somewhat of an
oversimplification. The decision to establish the Yugoslavia Tribunal was
made by the U.N. Security Council, which has not remained merely a
neutral third party; rather, it has itself become deeply involved in the
conflict.
The Security Council has imposed sanctions on the side perceived to
be responsible for the conflict, authorized the use of force, and sent in tens
of thousands of peacekeeping personnel. Its numerous resolutions have been
ignored and many of its peacekeeping troops have been injured or killed;
some have even been held hostage. Moreover, a compelling argument can
be made that the Security Council has (justifiably) favored the BosnianMuslims over the Serbs throughout the conflict. Although it imposed
sweeping economic sanctions on the Serbs; such action was never even
considered when Croatian forces committed similar acts of ethnic cleansing.
During the conflict, the Council has been quite vocal in its condemnation of
Serb atrocities, but its criticisms of those committed by Muslims and Croats
has been muted.
Although the Yugoslavia Tribunal is supposed to be independent
from the Security Council, one cannot ignore that the Tribunal's Prosecutor
was selected by the Security Council and its Judges were selected by the
General Assembly from a short list proposed by the Security Council. While
the Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute any one responsible for violations
of international humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia, it is perhaps no
surprise that the indictments so far have been overwhelmingly against Serbs.
As long as the jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals is triggered by a decision of
the Security Council, and the prosecutors and judges are selected by the
Council, such tribunals will be susceptible to the criticism that they are not
completely neutral. This is one of the reasons the international community is
so interested in establishing a permanent international criminal court.
B. Application of Ex Post Facto Laws
Perhaps the greatest criticism of Nuremberg was its perceived
application of ex post facto laws, by holding individuals responsible for
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waging a war of aggression. The first to voice this criticism was Senator
Robert Taft of Ohio in 1946, but it wasn't until John F. Kennedy reproduced
Taft's speech in his Pulitzer Prize winning 1956 book, Profiles of Courage,
that this criticism became part of the public legacy of Nuremberg.
The creators of the Yugoslavia Tribunal went to great lengths to
ensure that the Tribunal would not be subject to a similar criticism. Thus, in
drafting the Tribunal's Statute, the Secretary-General required that the
Tribunal's jurisdiction be defined on the basis of "rules of law which are
beyond any doubt part of customary international law." In its proposal for
the Tribunal's Statute, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
world's leading authority on international humanitarian law, "underlined the
fact that according to International Humanitarian Law as it stands today, the
notion of war crimes is limited to situations of international armed conflict."
In the first case to be heard before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the
defendant, Dusko Tadic, challenged the lawfulness of his indictment under
Article 2 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and Article 3
(violations of the customs of war) of the Tribunal's Statute on the ground that
there was no international armed conflict in the region of Prijedor, where the
crimes he was charged with are said to have been committed. In a novel
interpretation, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Appeals Chamber decided by a
vote of four to five that, although Article 2 of the Tribunal's Statute applied
only in international armed conflicts, Article 3 applied to war crimes
"regardless of whether they are committed in internal or international armed
conflicts."
The Tribunal based its decision on its perception of the trend in
international law in which "the distinction between interstate wars and civil
wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned." While
Professor Meron has argued convincingly for acceptance of individual
responsibility for violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols
additional thereto in the context of internal armed conflict, such recognition
would constitute progressive development of international law, rather than
acknowledgment of a rule that is beyond doubt found in existing law. In
addition to raising the ex post facto criticism, there is a second important
reason for the Tribunal to exercise greater caution in construing its
jurisdiction: States will not have faith in the integrity of the Tribunal as a
precedent for other ad hoc tribunals and for a permanent international
criminal court if the Tribunal is perceived as prone to expansive
interpretations of its jurisdiction.
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C. Violations of Defendant's Due Process
The Nuremberg Tribunal has been severely criticized for allowing
the prosecutors to introduce ex parte affidavits against the accused over the
objections of their attorneys. As Telford Taylor, one of the Prosecutors at
Nuremberg, wrote in his book Anatomy of the Nuremberg Tribunal, "[tiotal
reliance on ... untested depositions by unseen witnesses is certainly not the
most reliable road to factual accuracy. ... Considering the number of

deponents and the play of emotional factors, not only faulty observation but
deliberate exaggeration must have warped many of the reports."' Such
affidavits seriously undermined the defendant's right to confront witnesses
against him. In the case of Maryland v. Craig, the U.S. Supreme Court
expressed the importance of this right as follows: "Face-to-face confrontation
generally serves to enhance the accuracy of fact finding by reducing the risk
that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person."
On August 10, 1995, the Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal
issued a two to one decision, holding that the identity of several witnesses
could be withheld indefinitely from the defendant, Dusko Tadic, and his
counsel, even throughout the trial, in order to protect the witnesses and their
families from retribution. This decision is troubling in that it elevates the
protection of victims above the accused's right of confrontation,
notwithstanding the fact that the Article 20 of the Tribunal's Statute requires
that proceedings be conducted "with full respect for the rights of the
accused," and with merely "due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses." In addition, the Yugoslavia Tribunal rationalized its decision on
the ground that the Tribunal is "comparable to a military Tribunal" which
has more "limited rights of due process and more lenient rules of evidence."
It then cited favorably the practice of the Nuremberg Tribunal to admit
hearsay evidence and ex parte affidavits with greater frequency than would
be appropriate in domestic trials. Although the rationale for this decision
was that the United Nations had not established or funded a sufficient witness
protection program, it would have been better for the Tribunal to refuse to
proceed with the trial until such a program was set up than to go forward on
the basis of unidentified and anonymous witnesses.
D. Right of Appeal
A final criticism of Nuremberg was that it did not provide for the
right of appeal. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been recognized
as constituting a major advancement over Nuremberg by guaranteeing the
1.
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right of appeal and providing for a separate court of appeal. However, the
procedure for the selection of judges did not differentiate between trial and
appellate judges, leaving the decision to be worked out by the judges
themselves. When they arrived at the Hague, this became the subject of an
acrimonious debate, since nearly all the judges wished to be appointed to the
appeals chamber, which was viewed to be the more prestigious assignment.
As a compromise, the judges agreed that assignments would be for an initial
period of one year and subject to "rotat[ion] on a regular basis" thereafter.
The rotation principle adopted by the judges is at odds with the
provisions of the Tribunal's Statute intended to maintain a clear distinction
between the two levels of jurisdiction. Article 12 provides that there shall be
three judges in each Trial Chamber and five judges in the Appeals Chamber,
and Article 14(3) expressly states that a judge shall serve only in the
chamber to which he or she is assigned. These provisions were intended to
ensure the right of an accused to have an adverse judgment and sentence in a
criminal case reviewed by "a higher tribunal according to law," as required
by Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The purpose of the principle of the double degree of jurisdiction under which
judges of the same rank do not review each other's decision is to avoid
undermining the integrity of the appeals process as a result of the judges'
hesitancy to reverse decisions to avoid the future reversal of their own
decisions. The rotation principle, therefore, undermines the Yugoslavia
Tribunal's appellate process.
III. CONCLUSION
In the conclusion of Virginia Morris and my recent book on the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, we stated:
The Statute of the [Yugoslavia] Tribunal clearly meets the
international standards of due process established at
Nuremberg and reflects the significant developments in
international human rights standards in the last half
century. The detailed Rules of Procedure and Evidence
adopted by the judges pursuant to the Statute represents a
marked improvement over the scant set of rules that were
fashioned for the Nuremberg Tribunal. The Statute and
the Rules provide the necessary framework for ensuring
that the [Yugoslavia] Tribunal will comply with

660

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 2:655

international standards of fair trial and due process and
avoid the criticisms of its predecessor.2
In light of the subsequent developments described above, we may have been
too optimistic in our initial assessment. The Yugoslavia Tribunal's record so
far can only be described as a mixed one. It can, and must, do better. To
paraphrase Robert Jackson again, if we pass the defendants in an
international trial a poisoned chalice, it is we, the international community,
who is ultimately injured. For, the record upon which we judge Mr. Tadic
today, will be the record upon which history judges the effort to prosecute
crimes before an international Tribunal.
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